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Globalization and European integration are having a profound impact on Europe’s socio­
economic order. This paper argues that, while there is still considerable diversity among the 
national ‘capitalisms’ of western Europe, both globalization and integration are eroding these 
particularities. After examining the diversity of European ‘capitalisms’, we consider the 
arguments and evidence concerning their contemporary transformation. But beyond changes 
occurring in national ‘capitalisms’, there is also the question of what kind of socio-economic 
order, or ‘model of capitalism’ is emerging in Europe. In the second part of this paper we 
examine the impact of European policies on Europe’s national capitalisms and postulate the 
emergence of an new transnational form of capitalism. Rather than creating an Anglo-Saxon- 
type ‘neo-liberal’ regime on a grand scale, this integrates elements o f Anglo-Saxon corporate 





















































































































































































Globalization and European integration are having a profound impact on 
Europe’s socio- economic order. This paper1 focuses on the consequences for 
Europe’s ‘models’ of capitalism. It argues that while there is still considerable 
diversity among the national ‘capitalisms’ of western Europe, both 
globalization and integration are eroding national particularities, if not - as yet - 
pitching them towards full convergence. Their relative strengths provide them 
with comparative advantage in different sectors; they therefore remain in 
competition and the outcome of that contest is yet to be determined. But 
opposition between competing models of capitalist development is also 
manifested at the transnational level where opposing forces pursue similarly 
diverse strategies.
After examining the diversity of European ‘capitalisms’ below, we consider the 
arguments and evidence concerning their contemporary transformation. In 
doing so, the first part of this paper makes an exploratory examination of a 
relatively little investigated phenomenon outside the pages of the financial 
press - the politics of corporate governance in Europe. Corporate governance 
here is conceived broadly, not just in terms of the rules that regulate corporate 
activities but the relationships that surround the operation of the firm - between 
‘stakeholders’, shareholders, employees and the state.
But beyond the changes occurring in national ‘capitalisms’, there is also a 
question of what kind of socio-economic order, or ‘model of capitalism’ is 
emerging within the supranational regime of the European Union (EU). In the 
second part of this paper we examine the impact of European policies Europe’s 
national capitalisms and examine the emergence of an new transnational form 
of capitalism in Europe which, rather than creating an Anglo-Saxon ‘neo- 
liberal’ regime, integrates elements of Anglo-Saxon corporate governance and 
economic organization with established national institutions, norms and rules, 
thereby allowing for continued national diversity within a framework of 
‘embedded neo-liberalism’.
1 This is an extensively up-dated and revised version of M. Rhodes and B. van Apeldoom, 
‘Capitalism versus Capitalism in Western Europe’, in M. Rhodes, P. Heywood and V. Wright 



























































































CAPITALISM VERSUS CAPITALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE
1. The Diversity of West European Capitalisms
It is often maintained - especially in the debate over industrial policy and free 
trade - that companies, not countries, compete (e.g. Krugman 1994). This 
argument may have some sense when it comes to opposing the simplistic view 
that a nation’s industrial strategy should seek to emulate those of its 
competitors. But it discounts the fact - now backed by substantial analysis - that 
competitiveness has quite different meanings for firms and for the national 
economy and that a country’s institutional context is critical, not just in shaping 
the environment in which firms operate, but in creating a national ‘variety’ of 
capitalism in which firms are embedded as complex corporate and social 
organisations. In turn, although this is an even more controversial argument, the 
institutional context and national character of corporate organization will 
influence the performance of the firm and create comparative advantage for the 
economy. The conventional economist’s conception of ‘the naked firm’ - which 
competes as an independent, ‘decontextualised’ market actor - is untenable.2
So, at least for the time bing, is the argument that globalization has swept 
away the national distinctiveness of both firms and their national systems of 
innovation and support. Nevertheless, as we argue below, important tensions 
are now emerging between national systems and the ‘extra-national’ sphere of 
multinationals and global finance and within national systems between the 
protagonists of liberalizing change and the defenders of the status quo. Bit by 
bit, globalization - and the new domestic pressures and coalitions it generates - 
are beginning to unravel the cosy relationships between government, banks, 
companies and unions that underpinned national socio-economic orders. This 
process is neither creating ‘naked firms’ nor destroying national distinctiveness. 
For even multinational firms and global banks must comply with national and 
increasingly international regulations (Kapstein 1994); and the ‘historically 
rooted trajectories of growth’ created by national institutional relationships are
2 For a brief but cogent critique of Krugman, see Cohen (1994) who cites a definition of 
competitiveness from work by himself, John Zysman and Laura D’Andrea Tyson: ‘A nation’s 
competitiveness is the degree to which it can, under free and fair market conditions, produce 
goods and services that meet the test of international markets while simultaneously expanding 
the real incomes of its citizens. Competitiveness at the national level is based on superior 
productivity performance and the economy’s ability to shift output to high productivity 
activities which in turn can generate high levels of real wages. Competitiveness is associated 
with rising living standards, expanding employment opportunities, and the ability of a nation 
to maintain it international obligations. It is not just a measure of the nation’s ability to sell 




























































































not susceptible to rapid transformation or demise (Zysman 1994). But 
significant changes are occurring in Europe’s national capitalisms. And many 
of those changes indicate a degree of convergence on a new ‘hybrid’ model, 
pragmatically combining elements of different systems.
But what are these systems and how do they differ? Various attempts have been 
made to categorize capitalist systems, providing important insights into 
institutional distinctions and the ways they affect the functioning and 
performance of firms. Albert (1993) draws a distinction between ‘Atlantic’ 
(Thatcherite/Neo-American) and ‘Rhenish’ (German or Rhineland) capitalism. 
While the former prioritizes individual success and short-term financial profits, 
the latter promotes collective achievement, consensus and long-term results. 
We will investigate these distinctions shortly, but the principal differences 
derive from contrasts in corporate governance: while the key characteristics of 
the Atlantic model are arms-length relations between the sources of finance and 
firms, the supremacy of shareholder interests and little restriction on predatory 
behaviour (via mergers and acquisitions), those of the Rhenish model derive 
from the concept of ‘stakeholder’ capitalism - the location of the firm and its 
management within a network of interests, including banks and workers. The 
purpose is a collective one: the pursuit not of short-term profit but of the long­
term interests of all. While noting that in Europe only Britain and Germany 
conform, respectively, to these ideal-types, France, argues Albert, lies 
somewhere in between - the result of its long legacy of state intervention. Other 
countries also fit imperfectly. Regini (1995) and Bianco and Trento (1995) 
argue that Italy is quite distinct from either model - because of a mix of 
regulatory systems (one for small and another for large firms) and a highly 
specific form of corporate governance, including a closed system of ownership 
and control based on a complex, interlocking structure of largely family-owned 
holding companies. However, other authors - De Jong (1995) and Moerland 
(1995) - specify an all-inclusive continental brand of ‘network-oriented’ 
capitalism - as opposed to Anglo-Saxon ‘market-oriented’ systems (Britain and 
Ireland) - and divide it into two sub-varieties: the Germanic or ‘social market’ 
type (Germany, Benelux, the Netherlands, Denmark) and the Latin or 
‘pragmatic’ type (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain). France, again, is an 
awkward customer, as is Belgium. While De Jong places them both in the 
‘social market’ group (although France only since the mid-1980s when the state 
began to withdraw from widespread industrial and financial ownership), 
Moerland considers them members of the Latin family since they conform, by 
and large, with its principal features: the importance of family control, financial 
holdings, cross-shareholdings among companies and extensive state ownership. 
While acknowledging that it obscures some of the diversity amongst these 




























































































Quite apart from definitional problems, an objection can be made that the 
regional differentiation of economic governance within countries renders even 
the concept of national - let alone cross-national - regimes of capitalism too 
abstract. This is especially true of France, Germany and Italy which have quite 
distinct regional economic arrangements. Nevertheless, regional economic 
differentiation occurs within national systems and the latter will influence even 
strong regional economies: the dynamic German regions discussed by clearly 
benefit from the positive features of the national system, including that 
country’s patient capital markets and well-developed training systems (see 
Rhodes 1996). For all their limits, attempts to discover more or less distinct 
systems of economic governance in Europe are useful for understanding how 
economies function, how they compete and how they are changing.
Tables 1 and 2 present the essential characteristics of these systems, the first 
outlining the ‘external’ environment of firms, the second the system of 
‘corporate governance’, i.e. the nature of firm internal organization (the role of 
management, employee influence) and its relations with shareholders and 
institutional sources of finance. In much of the literature, negative and positive 
characteristics are imputed to these systems. These characteristics range from 
capacity for innovation and impact on productivity at the level of the firm 
through to social cohesion and implications for general economic performance. 
Although these are contested notions of ‘effectiveness’ and often border on the 
normative, it is useful to consider these given that the subject of this paper is 
the performance of these systems and their capacity for resisting or 
accommodating internally and externally generated pressures for change3.
These characteristics reveal substantial differences between the models. The 
most important differences are between the Germanic countries and the rest. 
For while the former provides a generally productive environment for firms - 
with high levels of education and R&D (research and development) support - 
the Anglo-Saxon and Latin countries are much less well-endowed in both 
respects. The Anglo-Saxon system may be establishing some comparative 
advantage with its higher level of labour market flexibility (the low level of 
constraints on employers both inside firms and in their ability to hire and fire) 
but by and large this is offset by the lower levels of education and skills in the
3 In this paper we try to avoid falling into either the ‘implicit normative’ or the ‘explicit 
mandarin normative’ trap discussed by Ronald Dore (1996) and, to further adopt his 
terminology, undertake an ‘analytic’ investigation which teases out the ‘causal connections... 
showing the multiplicity of forces that cause economic institutions to be different in different 
countries and might in future cause them to converge or diverge and... seeking generalizations 




























































































British work force, certainly by comparison with German, and, although to a 
lesser extent, France.
Table 1: Characteristics of Market and Network-Oriented Systems: 
External Environment
I n s t i tu t io n a l  C o n te x t M a r k e t -o r ie n te d N e tw o r k -o r ie n te d
A n g lo - S a x o n G e r m a n ic L a t in
R o le  o f  th e  S ta te Shift towards a A regulatory rather Extensive public
minimal state since the than interventionist owner- ship
1980s state
C o -o p era tio n  b etw een Conflictual until the Extensive at the Social pacts in Italy
socia l p a r tn ers 1980s; now minimal national level till late- and Portugal in
contact (Ireland 1960s. Revived in the 1980s/90s;
maintains corporatism) 1980s/90s problematic in Spain 
and Greece
L a b o u r  o r g a n iza tio n Union membership Union membership Union density
high till 1980s; density high; strong generally low:
fragmented centralized unions significant decline
organization outside public sector
E d u ca tio n  & tra in in g
Fragmented training High level of particip- Lower levels of
system; poor skills ation in vocational & participation in
provision professional training fragmented training 
systems
L a b o u r  m a rk e t flex ib ility
Poor internal High skills allow Lower internal
flexibility due to poor internal flexibility. flexibility (lower
skills; high external external flexibility skills); external
flexibility more restricted flexibility also 
restricted
N ation a l in n o v a tio n  sy stem
Low levels of R&D; Higher levels of R&D; France excepted, R&D
weak regional regionalized national and regional
innovation support innovation support support weak
F in a n ce  fo r  in n o v a tiv e system systems
sm a ll firm s
Explosion of venture Lack of venture Venture capital weak;
capital companies, but capital for new high- access to regional





























































































Table 2: Characteristics of Market and Network-Oriented Systems: 
Corporate Governance
C o r p o r a te  F e a tu r e s M a r k e t -o r ie n te d N e tw o r k -o r ie n te d
A n g lo - S a x o n G e r m a n ic L a t in
E m p lo y ee  in f lu e n c e Limited; Japanese FDI Extensive through Strong shop-floor
promotes shop-floor works councils on influence until early
collaboration, organization of work 1980S; now minimal
1980s/90s and training
R ole  o f  B an k s Banks play a minimal Universal banks play Bank holdings and
role in corporate an important role in participation in France
ownership corporate finance & 
control
& Spain only
R ole  o f  S to ck  E x ch a n g e Strong role in Publicly listed Stock exchanges
corporate finance; corporate firms relatively
70% of top 100 limited; stock undeveloped;
companies in UK 
listed
exchanges small closed ownership
S h a re h o ld er  so v ere ig n ty
Widely dispersed Number of freely Shareholder
share ownership; traded shares limited; sovereignty
dividends prioritized dividends less recognized but share-
prioritized holders rights 
restricted
F am ily  co n tr o lle d  Firms
General separation of Family ownership Family ownership and
equity ownership & important in small & control extensive.
management control medium-sized firms exercized through 
holdings
M a rk et fo r  co rp o ra te  
c o n tro l Scope for hostile Take-overs restricted; Take-overs restricted;
take-overs ‘corrects’ managers under direct little external
management failure stakeholder influence challenge to 
management
M a n a g em en t b o a rd s
One-tier board system: Two-tier board Administrative board
includes executive & system: supervisory & combines supervisory
non-executive executive & executive duties
managers responsibilities
M a n a g er ia l la b o u r  m a rk e t separate
Incentives (e.g. stock Performance-linked Incentives more
options) align manage- compensation limited: important (e.g. stock
ment with 
shareholders




























































































What, then, are the ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ features of these different types of
system?
In the Anglo-Saxon, market-oriented system, it is generally thought that the 
advantages stem from the dynamism imparted by both the external threat to 
poorly performing managers from hostile take-over and the incentives given 
them by performance-related compensation. The sovereignty of the 
shareholders is assumed to provide another check on management since the 
large shareholders can, in principle replace them. If managers are also the 
largest shareholders, however, this constraint is clearly reduced (Moerland 
1995a; 1995b). The disadvantages are several: the absence of long-term 
contractual relationships with suppliers of capital and workers may encourage 
short-term, quick-profit-oriented strategies; mergers and acquisitions - which 
have accelerated in recent years - may distract management from long-term 
corporate strategy, prioritize ‘paper entrepreneurialism’ (‘get-rich-quick’ 
schemes) and encourage asset-stripping and empire-building, without 
necessarily adding to productivity or the enduring viability of firms; and the 
priority given to the shareholder interest may militate against the interest of 
employees, for not only are management-employee relations less 
institutionalized and, arguably, less productive in the Anglo-Saxon firm, but 
employee remuneration as a proportion of net value added is much lower. But 
perhaps the most damning indictment of the market-oriented system (at least in 
the British case) refers to its poor corporate performance. For although short­
term profits are higher than in the Germanic system, the long-term survival of 
Anglo-Saxon corporations has been questioned; while in 1970 they accounted 
for over one third of the largest 180 European firms, by 1992 their share had 
fallen to less than a fifth (De Jong 1995).
This almost certainly has as much to do with the less than productive general 
environment of the firm as its particular form of corporate governance. The 
most important weaknesses are a poorly developed and fragmented training 
system, which the introduction of a system of national vocational qualifications 
and a new training system based on employer-run training and enterprise bodies 
(TECs) has still fundamentally to tackle; short-termism in finance (highly 
centralized, in addition to its international vocation, the financial sector fails in 
providing local finance where detailed local knowledge, risk assessment and 
commitment to longer-term investment is required); and persistently lower 
levels of spending on R&D than the European average, except in defence, 
despite one of the highest rates of profit growth in Europe in the 1980s (Walker 
1993). This may also reflect a system of corporate governance oriented to 
shareholder - and, increasingly, executive - remuneration rather than longer- 




























































































The network-oriented systems of the European continent also have advantages 
and disadvantages, the latter generally receiving much less publicity and 
attention than the former - especially among British exponents of the ‘social 
market’ system (e.g. Hutton 1995). Among the advantages generally attributed 
to network-oriented, ‘contractual’ corporate governance are the benefits of 
close and long-term relationships between firms and strategic capital suppliers. 
Often with board representation (as in the German supervisory board system) 
banks will, at least in theory, be wed informed about managerial behaviour and 
performance and provide a more ‘constructive’ form of control than the Anglo- 
Saxon ‘market’ for corporate control - i.e., the threat of take over and dismissal. 
At the same time, a better institutionalized and similarly longer-term 
relationship between management and employees should allow an ongoing 
process of conflict free organizational adjustment within the firm, especially in 
the adoption of new technology and the associated redeployment of workers4. 
This process of adjustment is facilitated, in turn, by the nature of the external 
environment, with its strong support in terms of transferable skills and 
regionalized R&D facilities in centres of education and research. In certain 
German regions (e.g. Baden-Wiirttemberg), this support network has been 
bolstered by a regional government commitment to consolidating the links 
between state, industry and science.
But what of the negative aspects? As Moerland (1995) points out, there are two 
major potential disadvantages. The absence of an active external market for 
corporate control means that managerial failure may not be corrected, 
especially in those countries where the positions of managers and employees 
are strongly protected. At the same time, the strong ‘insider’ role of capital 
suppliers (the famous Hausbanken) in the German case creates an information 
gap to the disadvantage of ‘outsider’ smaller investors. One can add that in 
Germany, but even more so in France and Italy, the intimate relationships 
between capital suppliers and managers are often consolidated by membership 
of a relatively closed elite (e.g. the incestuous network of graduates of the 
prestigious Ecole nationale d’administration in France; the restricted 
membership of Italy’s so-called salotto buono, the select club of leaders of the 
largest traditional companies and financial organisations). While this facilitates 
contractual relationships and may in some ways enhance industrial adjustment
4 As discussed further on in this paper, this ‘advantage’ has been increasingly contested by 
certain German employers for the ‘rigidities’ it introduces in restructuring and adjustment. On 
the other hand, recent studies have shown that companies such as Lufthansa with statutory 
works councils have been as effectively remodelled as their Anglo-Saxon competitors such as 
British Airways, even if corporate change has also shaken up traditional hierarchies and 



























































































(by creating joint strategic orientations on the part all those involved in 
corporate governance), covert cross-shareholdings may also create a degree of 
collusive complacency, allowing bad decisions to remain unchecked and, in the 
worst cases, encouraging corruption. Recent corporate disasters in Germany 
(Metalgesellschaft, Schneider, Bremer-VulKan), corruption investigations in 
France (Lyonnaise des Eaux, Générale des Eaux) and judicial investigations 
into corporate practice in Italy (Fiat’s Gemina financial holding) all provide 
evidence of this problem. The relatively weak equity (stock) markets in these 
countries arguably compound the problem, for management is often over­
protected from the influence of system ‘outsiders’: the fund managers, small 
and foreign investors who are excluded from the contractual system but are 
now struggling hard to make their voices heard.
But the real problems for these systems come less from their existing systems 
of corporate governance and the institutions in which they are embedded than 
from the impact of globalization. In its different forms, this threatens a 
significant transformation of the continental European ‘model’ over the coming
years.
2. Globalization and System Transformation
The threat from globalization is two-fold. The first is to established and cosy 
systems of corporate governance as globalization places a premium on two 
alternative strategies: ‘going global’ and becoming a player in rapidly changing 
international product markets (e.g. large car manufacturers who have developed 
the ‘world car’ based on standardized components sourced internationally but 
customized for particular markets); or ‘locking into the local’ and serving 
specific market niches. The former strategy accentuates the breach between 
companies and their domestic corporate environments already opened by the 
traditional multinational. The second challenge partly derives from the first, but 
is compounded by intensified international competition. For not only are the 
ties that bind the corporate organization to the domestic environment strained 
and sometimes broken. But the national company infrastructure of training, 
education, research and development need to be constantly upgraded, and its 
flexibility in terms of employment and remuneration increased, as process and 
product innovation accelerates and newly industrialized countries - with lower 
costs, well-educated work forces and more flexible institutional systems -move 
into higher technology markets. All of these developments have far-reaching 
implications for traditional contracts in the triadic relationship between capital, 




























































































Although these developments and the national debates triggered by them are 
also being conducted in the other ‘network’ economies, Germany is witnessing 
the most spectacular changes and threats to its traditional system of corporate 
governance, in part because it is Europe’s most successful economy and has 
some of Europe’s most dynamic companies. Whether banks or industrial 
groups, these will not be slow to exploit the new opportunities arising in the 
global economy and this will have knock-on effects on domestic business and 
financial organization.
First, there is a problem of escalating social costs linked to the high level of 
welfare spending that is typical of these systems, and its dependence on funding 
from employers’ - and employees’ - contributions in many ‘network’ 
countries. This creates a growing non-wage labour cost problem for 
manufacturers. The relocation issue has become an increasingly salient one, 
given shifts of lower technology industry to the Asia-Pacific (the German 
BASF chemicals company has recently announced the transfer of its world­
wide leather and textile chemicals’ division to Singapore after the shift of most 
of its German client companies to the region) and medium-technology firms to 
Britain (where the ratio of profit to labour costs for new projects is eleven times 
higher than at home). Although it is frequently pointed out that this 
phenomenon has been exaggerated (especially by employers trying to break 
generous work organization and pay deals with their employees), there are 
signs of a growing real problem in this respect. A recent survey by the DIHT 
(the umbrella organization of Germany’s chambers of industry and commerce) 
found that 28 per cent of West German manufacturers are planning to locate 
production abroad over the next three years, with nearly two-thirds citing 
labour costs as the main reason (Marsh 1997). These developments have 
generated a lively debate in Germany as to the future of Standort Deutschland - 
Germany as a location for industry’. Within Germany itself there is a major, 
structural economic adjustment problem with little evidence of any substantial 
shift from medium into high technology sectors. As in France, this is the 
consequence of a number of factors, including a poorly developed venture 
capital sector and an innovation system locked into traditional sectors and 
technologies (Keck 1993; Chesnais 1993). As Streeck (1995) warns, rising 
unemployment and a lack of technological dynamism may mean that the 5
5 Similar developments have occurred in other European countries, including, most notably, 
Sweden, where the relocation debate has been as vigorous as in Germany. Here the problem 
seems to be less labour costs and corporate tax rates (which are low) than very high personal 
tax rates, which makes it hard for companies like Ericsson and Astra to retain and attract 
personnel for their large R&D operations. In May 1997, Ericsson announced that it was 





























































































German system of knowledge production and diffusion has lost touch with 
changing markets and that the virtues of the system in the past - its training 
system, cost structure, pattern of product and process innovation - may become 
liabilities in a globalized economy.
As for the globalization of finance, while retail banking remains largely nation- 
bound and its competitiveness derives from being ‘locked into’ localities (it 
serves particular local and regional customers, is dependent on carefully 
constructed networks and hemmed in by still nation-based legal systems) 
corporate banking and bond and equity transactions have long ‘gone global’. 
The most dynamic European banks and financial groups are now becoming 
international operators. And the integration of both them and their national 
financial markets into a liquid ‘Euro’-market for securities, and increasingly 
competitive banking and insurance markets with the creation of a European 
financial area (and eventually monetary union) augurs ill for the maintenance of 
traditional corporate structures - particularly stable and ‘compassionate’ 
lending through cross-shareholdings between banks and industry - in both 
Germany and France (see Story 1996). Two of the three large German banks 
(which, in their close relations with firms, have constituted the core of the 
German corporate finance system) are engaged in the current rush to build 
global investment banks capable of challenging the dominance of the giant US 
firms like Goldman Sachs. Having allowed their industrial holdings to run 
down in recent years - by not subscribing to new issues, for example - German 
banks are now diversifying their investments, both industry-wise and country- 
wise (see Schroder 1996). Deutsche Bank (which operates in the City of 
London through its subsidiary Morgan Grenfell - which has all the 
characteristics of an American firm) and Dresdner Bank (which has purchased 
London investment banker Kleinwort Benson) are considering disposing of 
some of their industrial shareholdings in Germany altogether and increasing 
their investments abroad.6 The French financial group Paribas is acting 
similarly, restructuring its portfolio of equity investments, selling stakes in 
France, Belgium and Luxembourg and buying in Asia. At the same time, driven 
by the need to raise funds internationally to develop an international presence 
in medium and especially high-technology sectors, large continental companies 
are both engaging in joint ventures with other transnationals (which in itself 
challenges conventional modes of corporate governance) or seeking citation on 
Anglo-Saxon stock markets in London or New York. These are much larger
6 Although this is restricted by the 50-60 per cent capital gains tax they would have to pay on 
such sales - and legislation to change this is currently (May 1997) bogged down in protracted 
negotiations between the Christian Democrat/Liberal coalition and opposition Social 





























































































and more efficient than their relatively under-developed counterparts in the 
‘networked economies’ in Paris, Frankfurt or Milan. Hence, alongside the 
Standort Deutschland debate, there is another, equally concerned discussion 
about the future of Finanzplatz Deutschland - Germany as a financial centre.
The general ‘academic’ consensus is that dramatic results should not be 
expected from such changes, despite the prediction of Albert (1993) that, 
although less successful in terms of reconciling profits and social justice, the 
Anglo-Saxon model would triumph due to its cosmopolitan character and its 
linkage to the media globalization of Anglo-Saxon culture. As far as corporate 
governance is concerned, it is assumed that the fundamental characteristics of 
the continental ‘network’ systems will persist, with some shift towards Anglo- 
Saxon methods, while the Anglo-Saxon ‘market-oriented’ systems will 
gradually take on some ‘network’ aspects (e.g. Carl Kester 1992; Schneider- 
Lenne 1994). Zysman (1994, 1995) argues strongly against the presumption 
that national systems can be eroded by ‘globalization’ (a term he also contests).
The net effect of the changes sketched out above may well be to reduce the 
distinctiveness of national systems rather than undermine their basic principles, 
perhaps backing Zysman’s (1995) conclusion that what we are witnessing is not 
convergence but ‘parallel development’. However, if we observe the dynamics 
of how certain small changes produce much wider repercussions, we can 
predict a turbulent time ahead, especially for the ‘network systems’, for the 
‘market’ systems already conform with, rather than resist, the new global 
pressures. In fact, several dynamics, in which domestic and international forces 
interact, are at work in destabilizing traditional ‘contractual’ relations in these 
countries and their consequences clearly suggest movement in an ‘Anglo- 
Saxon’ direction. Globalization is central to all of them and not just an 
anonymous, external force: for as has long been recognized, although 
international agents (such as multinational companies) working within 
domestic contexts may be important agents of change, equally as potent are the 
new roles (and ‘global’, liberalizing, ideology) adopted by domestic agents 
themselves.
The combined impact of these forces can be examined in three critical areas, in 
each of which a significant shift in power between actors is occurring:
• in corporate governance, especially in terms of the balance of power between 
‘stakeholders’ and shareholders;
• in the relationship between and respective weight of the ‘public and the 
private’ in these systems;
• and in the balance between capital and labour in the ‘networked’ (and 




























































































‘Stakeholders’ versus ‘Shareholders’ in Corporate Governance
Contemporary developments already reveal a degree of convergence along 
several dimensions of corporate governance (see Moerland 1995b). Banks are 
arguably becoming mere important in market systems as the universal banking 
model becomes more widely spread, while the power of banks in network 
systems looks as though it will be reduced, not just because banks in network 
system are allowing their stakes in national companies to decline, but because 
of growing opposition to banking power, especially to the German bank 
practice of owning large blocks of equity in firms. It may of course be the case 
that as large commercial banks in network systems spread their investments 
globally, they will also exporting their model of universal banking with 
extensive equity stakes abroad. But much more likely on current evidence is 
that they will accommodate their practices to those prevailing in the countries 
where they invest (as in the case of German ventures into Anglo-Saxon 
investment banking in the City of London) while becoming the major 
proponents of a more aggressive, ‘Anglo-Saxon’ style of capitalism at home. 
This phenomenon is explored in greater detail below.
Recent evidence also suggests that network systems will increasingly 
accommodate the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ characteristic of channelling capital flows to 
corporations through investment funds, pension funds and insurance 
companies, while managers will identify more closely with stock price 
behaviour as more companies seek stock market quotation and managers 
remuneration is tied more closely to performance (through stock-options, for 
example). Funded pensions are spreading - albeit slowly for the time being - 
and, as they do so, they will take their ‘Anglo-Saxon’ values with them. 
Continental countries are becoming more accommodating to funded pension 
schemes as a solution to the demographic problem of an ever-climbing ratio of 
retired to the employed7. While the Anglo-Saxon market for corporate control 
seems to be becoming less ferocious (as corporate raiding, hostile take-overs 
and asset stripping lose favour), management in ‘network’ countries is 
becoming increasingly subject to the influence of shareholders, the result of a 
combination of growing shareholder pressure and new EU regulations (see 
below). This has important implications not just for the balance between 
‘stakeholder’ and shareholder power in the network systems but also for the 
behaviour of companies and the priorities they give to particular interests. 
German companies are leading the way in adopting both the rhetoric and 
practice of ‘shareholder value’. Large German companies (Deutsche Bank and
7 It should be noted though that European funded pensions are developing only slowly. 
Attempts at the European level to create a more liberal environment for pension fund 




























































































Daimler Benz) are leading the way in introducing stock option schemes for 
senior management,8 while others are also modifying their internal rules 
regarding the rights of shareholders and transparency: Continental has 
abolished the rule limiting voting rights to 5 per cent or more of equity capital, 
while Bayer has raised the return on shareholder’s funds from 14 to 20 per cent. 
Deutsche Bank has introduced IAS (International Accounting Standard) 
accounting and Veba, the energy and telecommunications’ group, has shifted to 
GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Standards) (Marsh 1996). In France 
and Germany, the growing number of Anglo-Saxon institutional investors on 
shareholder rosters means that managers are increasingly oriented towards 
restructuring and a more aggressive exploitation of market opportunities.
This last point alerts us to the fact that, while the increasingly international 
reach of these companies clearly plays a role, but so too does the penetration of 
their domestic markets by foreign actors with a different set of corporate 
values. Germany, France, Italy and the other continental economies have all 
witnessed an increase in the domestic presence of foreign - especially American 
- investors, attracted by the opening up of European markets and the lucrative 
business generated by the privatization programmes launched by all 
governments in recent years. Now while the nature of privatization differs from 
country to country (in some, like France and Italy, companies are often secured 
from foreign take-over by continued government stakes or shareholder pacts 
between core investors), its net effect has been to undermine traditional 
relationships. This is not just because foreign (Anglo-Saxon) investors have 
different expectations from ‘stakeholders’ with a longer-term interest; but 
because privatization and the liberalization of continental markets has also 
expanded the size of the domestic lobby opposing traditional, and privileged, 
contractual relations.
The role played by the domestic pro-market lobby in eroding traditional 
relationships is discussed below in terms of the changing balance between 
private and public power. As far as external influence is concerned, it is 
difficult to discern its full extent or importance without further research. 
However, there is already substantial (although still fragmented) evidence of 
the way in which foreign financial services companies have expanded in the 
European market, bringing more aggressive American business methods with 
them. This has begun to influence the ways in which domestic companies also 
do business, given that, until recently, financial intermediaries in most 
European countries have been as hidebound and conservative as their stock
8 It is worth noting that another ‘network’ system - Japan - is travelling a similar path in terms 





























































































markets. American business culture is being spread throughout Europe by the 
growing presence of US institutional investors, consultancy firms and credit 
agencies like Standard & Poors which exercise considerable influence over the 
direction and nature of investment, not to mention the arrival of a new 
generation of executives trained in US business schools or with formative 
career years in US companies.9 Goldman Sachs, for example, is becoming a 
major operator, if not the major operator in mergers and acquisitions in a 
number of European countries. In 1996 in France it beat the Parisian company 
Lazard Frères into second place in the French mergers and acquisitions 
business league (Jack 1997) and has also been a key player on the protagonists’ 
side in two recent hostile take-over bids - a still unusual and headline grabbing 
phenomenon in continental capitalism: the first was the successful take-over of 
Docks de France by the Auchan retailing group in France, the second the 
spectacular but ultimately unsuccessful steel sector bid by Krupp Hoesch for 
Thyssen in 1996 (opposed by both politicians and striking steel workers as 
heralding the arrival of capitalism ‘Anglo-Saxon style’ in Germany).
As already mentioned above, one obvious way that the foreign lobby is 
influencing corporate governance is by encouraging the spread of shareholder 
sovereignty in the ‘network’ systems. In France, Germany and Italy, lobbying 
by shareholder groups for greater management transparency and responsiveness 
has been backed by foreign shareholders and fund managers frustrated by the 
interlocking elite relationships that still dominate these systems.10 More 
generally, the shift towards greater reliance on equity markets and the 
desirability of international alliances are forcing even the most secretive private 
companies to become more open. Even in Italy where corporate culture is at its 
most opaque, companies are being forced to become more transparent: attempts 
by companies like Fiat to forge the international alliances they need to grow are 
forcing them to consider transformation from family-owned conglomerates into 
public ones; Olivetti has been forced to report quarterly figures in response to a 
1996 shareholders’ revolt that also toppled chairman Carlo De Benedetti. As 
one observer has commented, alongside the dismantling of the Italian public 
sector, a combination of both internal and external pressures is forcing the 
‘privatization’ of the Italian private sector (Betts 1997). As discussed below,
’ There has recently been a proliferation of such people in the new structure created by the 
merger of Mercedes Benz and Daimler Benz in January 1997.
1(1 To date, however, the tactics used by large US pension funds in the US to shake up 
management in the companies where they invest have not been widely employed in Europe: it 
was expected that Calpers (the California Public Employee’s Retirement Funds) which has 
large holdings in both the UK and France would adopt such tactics there but so far it has 




























































































governments are gradually responding to these pressures, introducing new 
legislation to open up the club-like character of continental corporate control.
The Changing Balance between Public and Private-sector Power
A major cleavage has opened up between private sector actors who have 
embraced the new world of the liberalized market place and those companies 
which retain a public sector character and a more social’ orientation. K.iitica 
struggles along this divide promise to become one of the major determinants of 
the future shape of national capitalisms in western Europe.
Take France, for example, where large parts of the extensive public industrial 
and financial sector (built up by the Socialist government in the early 1980s) is 
now being privatized. While certain large corporations will remain under state 
control - especially non-commercial financial institutions such as the mutual 
banks, the Caisse d’Epargne savings bank network, the Crédit Agricole and the 
Post Office - the way that they operate will have to change substantially as the 
result of an onslaught by the expanding commercial sector on their special 
lending rights and subsidies. Long seen as a central part of a ‘socially-oriented’ 
banking system, these institutions are now seen as the source of ‘competitive 
distortions’. Private sector French banks have increasingly attacked the 
allegedly unfair way that the state has repeatedly bailed out Crédit Lyonnais, 
the highly loss making French public sector bank (which has received FF49 bn 
of aid to date). And backed by the powerful Jean-Claude Trichet, the governor 
of the bank of France and head of the state regulatory Banking Commission, 
they and their political allies have been waging war on the ‘uncompetitive 
practices’ of those financial institutions which remain protected by the state. 
The Caisse d’Epargne is a key target, for it is not obliged to pay dividends on 
its shares and has exclusive rights to offer the Livret A, a tax-exempt savings 
product. The commercial banks claim that this special status distorts 
competition and enables the savings bank network to undercut them and reduce 
their interest rates to uncompetitive levels.
Meanwhile, in Germany a similar cleavage has opened up between the private 
sector banks (grouped in the German Banking Association) and public sector 
banks, again over alleged unfair competition. An example is the accusation 
levelled against WestLB and five other public banks for receiving capital 
injections in the form of housing development funds. The private banks say that 
the interest rates were below market rate levels and therefore a distortion of 
competition. They have gone so far as to ask Brussels to intervene in the matter, 
embarrassing both the Commission and the German government which has 




























































































banks to promote the Euro at a time of widespread public hostility to its 
adoption. Bonn and the Lander also regard the public banks as important agents 
of regional policy. Moreover, the Landesbanken are deeply embedded in local 
political structures: many politicians sit on the boards of the regional banks 
where they exert influence over lending activities, securing backing, for 
example, for community projects. Again, the main agents seeking to erode this 
system are the large German banks which, having been pillars of ‘Model 
Deutschland’ in the past have become its most powerful antagonists: not 
without justification, Friedel Neuber, the chairman of the public bankers’ 
association has accused the private bankers’ association of acting as a front for 
the big German banks led by Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerz 
Bank. The latter have also been active in hostile take-over bids (as in the role of 
Deutsche Bank in the bid by Krupp Hoesch for Thyssen in 1996 - attracting the 
hostility of politicians, trade unionists and other businessmen in the process) 
and in attacking the government for the delays in its liberalizing economic 
reform programme (see below).
The Changing Balance of Power in Industrial Relations
The effect of globalization on employee influence and solidarity in the 
'networked’ (and especially ‘Germanic’ firm) is far reaching. Quite apart from 
the issue of non-wage labour cost competition - with all that implies for wider 
issues of social welfare policy - there is the pressure that the changing nature of 
the global corporation will place on the tradition of social consensus. First, 
German employers - like their counterparts in other ‘organized’ capitalist 
countries like Denmark and Sweden - have been decentralizing bargaining to 
the level of the firm to tailor costs more precisely to its needs. Solidarity among 
workers is consequently diminished. In addition, as ‘networked’ firms ‘go 
global’ and embrace new methods of business organization and new forms of 
finance, the traditionally greater share of net value added they distributed to 
workers in the past will be challenged by the growing power of institutional 
shareholders - both domestic (including newly liberated pension funds) and 
foreign.
The net effect of these developments has been to strengthen the power of 
capital greatly and to force a shift towards a European version of American 
‘concession bargaining’ even in those network systems where labour remains 
strong and well organized and able to exert countervailing power over 
employers. Even if it does not actually relocate all parts of its production, 
conception and design process, the increasingly internationalized firm can use 
its locational power (i.e. the threat of exit) to modify contractual relations at 




























































































shareholder and the stakeholder economies. Firms have increasingly used 
locational threats to renegotiate established industrial relations bargains, and in 
recent years they have been extensively used to weaken the power of unions 
and force concession bargaining by Daimler Benz, Bosch, BMW as well as 
multinationals with a wider scope such as GM Europe (see Mueller 1996). 
German companies and unions are now agreeing patterns of flexible working 
that were unthinkable just five years ago, and many of these are reached locally 
with company works’ councils, thereby circumventing national agreements. But 
the national union, IG Metall is also sometimes involved. This was the case in a 
recent example of concession bargaining from Osram, the German light bulb 
manufacturer which is part of the Siemen’s group. A deal with the union was 
forced after the company threatened to shift production from Augsburg to Bari 
in southern Italy where labour costs are some 40 per cent lower. In the 
productivity deal that saved the plant for Augsburg, the union agreed that the 
new production line there would be kept running for 160 hours a week, 18 
hours longer than the previous maximum for the plant.
More generally, certain employers’ associations and large companies are testing 
both the will of the government and of labour in key areas of labour regulation. 
In August 1996, Werner Stumfe, the head of Gesamptmetall, which represents 
8500 German engineering companies launched an attack on the influence of 
trade unions on management boards in large German companies, arguing that it 
prevented competitive restructuring and was deterring foreign investment in 
Germany. A month later, Daimler-Benz, Siemens and Mannesmann cut sick 
pay unilaterally by 20 per cent, provoking widespread labour unrest (although it 
should be noted that many other large companies opposed this action as 
destructive to what they still see as the broadly positive German system of 
consensual industrial relations). Similar unilateral action by Renault in early 
1997 to shift production from Belgium to Valladolid in Spain - where labour 
costs were more than 30 per cent lower - provoked an even wider uproar 
involving unions, the Belgian government and the European Commission 
which rebuked the company for its failure to observe standard consultation 
procedures. Renault is being pressured by both over capacity in the EU auto 
industry and by competitive pressures to follow other car manufactures in 





























































































The Triumph of Anglo-Saxon Capitalism?
None of this means that continental capitalist systems will be transformed over 
night. Indeed, there is considerable resistance from companies - including 
multinational companies - the labour movement and governments to a 
wholesale adoption of Anglo-Saxon practice. Numerous examples of such 
resistance have been discussed above: German opposition to hostile take-over 
bids, including the widespread chorus of disapproval voiced by national and 
local politicians, business and labour representatives to the abortive Krupp 
Hoesch bid for Thyssen; the opposition by French and German politicians and 
public-sector bankers to the hegemonic pretensions of the large commercial 
banks whose activities have been expanded by the liberalization of capital 
markets; the resistance of workers to attempts by high-profile companies to 
shift the balance of power fundamentally in industrial relations (Renault in 
Belgium, Daimler-Benz, Siemens and Mannesman in the German sick pay 
dispute). One could add the strength of large and powerful actors, such as the 
Italian investment bank Mediobanca, or the financial groups Paribas and Indo 
Suez in France, in governing the tight network of relations that span the cross- 
and circular shareholdings and interlocking boards that are a key feature of the 
continental systems - and a major defence against outsider influence and far- 
reaching change in corporate practice.
At the same time, it is important to recognize how interdependence between the 
institutional features of the network systems creates formidable pressures for 
conformity as well as institutional ‘lock in’ and path-dependence. Moreover, 
systems of corporate governance and industrial relations in all systems, but 
especially the legalistic continental systems, are based on a complex set of rules 
that require political intervention and reform. New EU regulations (see the next 
section) have gone some way to breaking down national distinctiveness through 
new laws on competition, for example, but, as discussed below, most of these 
allow ample scope for national variation, although within narrower limits than 
in the past. This is where the national politics of corporate governance remains 
important since market forces alone cannot erode established national traditions 
of corporate governance. And attempts to change the rules governing these 
systems have become the subject of major political debate.
Much of this debate has been triggered by reforms to changes in the balance 
between ‘stakeholders’ and shareholders which, as discussed above, is already 
occurring, breaking down the power of clubby cliques at the peak of corporate 
organizations. In France, political clashes and opposition from companies seem 
to have been avoided by the voluntary nature of new codes of governance 




























































































Committee of the French employer’s federation, the CNPF, and parallel 
proposals from the Senate’s Marini Committee. These have been influenced in 
part by the recommendations of the 1994 Cadbury report in the UK, which 
became semi-compulsory for British listed companies, and concern the rights of 
minority shareholders and the monitoring of accounts and remuneration 
packages (OECD 1997). In Spain, the new conservative government set up a 
commission in 1997 to overhaul that country’s arcane and opaque corporate 
governance system to deal with the widely perceived problem of unwieldy 
company boards, dominated by highly paid members bound by family ties, 
whose activities lack transparency and who generally fail to respond to 
shareholders’ interests. Again, policies to open up the corporation and elevate 
shareholders’ interests to a higher level will not necessarily overturn the 
existing system or align it with Anglo-Saxon practice, but one of the key 
elements of continental capitalism - the closed, backroom conduct of corporate 
affairs - is clearly under siege. In Spain and France, the prospects of a peaceful 
transition and accommodation of the new with the old, however, seem to be 
good. But in Germany a much bloodier political battle has developed around 
wide-ranging legislative proposals which strike at the heart of the German 
model and which are pitching the large banks and many government politicians 
against the Social Democratic opposition. The Third Financial Market 
promotion law contains more than 100 detailed deregulatory measures to 
strengthen the market for risk capital and the scope of fund managers to invest. 
Amendments to the law governing joint stock companies would modify the 
distribution of roles between supervisory and management boards, give 
shareholders greater accountability and limit the influence of banks where these 
hold more than 5 per cent of a company’s capital. One of the most controversial 
items - to abolish restrictions on shareholder rights in listed companies - would 
provide specific encouragement to take-overs since they currently allow 
managers to resist the influence of large shareholders in the event of such a bid.
The politics of corporate governance is as yet an unexplored subject: its 
growing importance and greater visibility across Europe is indication in itself 
of the resistance that has emerged to the transformation of European capitalism 
as a result of globalization and the establishment of the single European market, 
a resistance that will help prevent the creation of a uniform system, let alone the 
complete and uncritical adoption of the Anglo-Saxon model. Nevertheless, as 
the above discussion has stressed, important dynamics are at work that are 
destabilizing and eroding traditional relations underpinning these systems. This 
process will be accelerated as the implementation of single market directives is 
completed and European monetary integration proceeds. As already stressed, 
this does not mean the wholesale triumph of Anglo-Saxon capitalism in 




























































































the emergence of a new and more standardized form of transnational capitalism 
- ‘embedded neo-liberalism’ - that allows for national diversity within the EU 
but within much narrower margins than in the past.
THE EUROPEAN DIM ENSION: A TRANSNATIONAL M ODEL OF 
CAPITALISM ?
As we stated in the introduction, the opposition between competing models of 
capitalism is also manifest at the European level where a similar struggle has 
occurred. As a result, a novel supranational socio-economic order or ‘model of 
capitalism’ is taking shape. Four ideological and strategic orientations have 
been in contest: ‘European social democracy’; neo-mercantilism; neo­
liberalism; and ‘embedded neo-liberalism’ (for a full discussion, see Apeldoom 
1996).
• Pan-European social democracy is promoted by social democratic political 
forces and the European trade union movement, and was spurred forward by 
the former European Commission president, Jacques Delors. To the extent 
that it promotes both a European ‘social dialogue’ and a Commission-led 
industrial policy for ‘Euro-champion’ firms, it is a hybrid of the German 
‘social market’ model and the French ‘interventionist’ model (Ross 1993). 
For Delors (1992), as for other social democrats, a united Europe offered an 
opportunity to protect the European ‘social model’ - the mixed economy and 
extensive social protection - against globalization and neo-liberalism. 
Following Delors’ departure, this project has lost significant momentum and 
has been sidelined by European business.
• Neo-liberalism is the ideological outlook of global financial capital (based 
primarily in the City of London), but also of some (mainly British) 
multinationals. This strategic orientation favours European integration only 
in as far as it leads to freer markets, i.e. less regulation and fewer barriers to 
trade. The European region must be wholly subordinate to the world 
economy and exposed to what are seen as the beneficial forces of 
globalization.
• Neo-mercantilism is the dialectical opposite, oriented instead towards a 
strong regional economy through industrial policy and the promotion of 
Euro-champions (if necessary protected by European tariff walls) as a 




























































































which, although producing on a transnational scale, nevertheless primarily 
serve and are dependent on the European market.
• Embedded neo-liberalism is the preferred option of the truly global 
transnationals (TNCs) which produce, market and sell their goods in all three 
of the world’s macro-regions - Europe, North America and Asia (Ohmae 
1985). Most explicitly advocated by German firms, it is clearly committed to 
a free trading Europe that is fully open and adapted to the global economy. It 
is premised on a strong belief in the free market and supports neo-liberal 
policies of deregulation and flexibilisation. Nevertheless, it falls short of the 
orthodox neo-liberal model as promoted, for example, by Thatcherism, for its 
advocates recognize that the free market must be embedded in a regulatory 
framework which fosters both competitive business and social consensus 
(Holman 1992; Hodges and Woolcock 1993).
The Emergence of a Transnational Business ‘Ideology’
The struggle between these rival strategies has partly shaped the course of the 
European integration process since the beginning of the 1980s, as illustrated by 
the case of the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT), a transnational 
business forum consisting of some 40 top executives of European TNCs. The 
ERT played a major agenda-setting role in the relaunching of the European 
integration process (see Sandholtz and Zysman 1989, Holman 1992, and 
Cowles 1995 for accounts of this role), and is unique both in representing large 
sections of European business at the highest level and in transcending the 
conventional forms of EU corporate lobbying. We can detect all three basic 
business orientations outlined above in the evolution of the ERT and its 
strategy (this analysis is developed further in Apeldoorn 1996 and 
forthcoming).
In the 1980s, the main dividing line within European transnational business 
was between ‘neo-mercantilists’ and ‘neo-liberals’, and ‘embedded neo­
liberalism’ was borne as a synthesis from this struggle. During its first five 
years (1983 to 1988), the ERT was clearly dominated by the ‘neo-mercantilists’ 
and a protectionist régionalisation strategy. Thus, although the Roundtable’s 
first priority was to ‘relaunch Europe with an industrial initiative’ by creating 
the European internal market, a protectionist attitude towards global 
competition could also be detected. In this respect there was a partial 
convergence with the social democratic project. As noted above, Delors himself 
wanted to promote a ‘Euro-champion strategy’. But attempts by parts of the 
Delors Commission to establish a European industrial policy along those lines 




























































































operate. In fact, collaboration with non-European partners became a primary 
goal, precluding any ‘Europeanist’ solutions beyond existing and limited co­
operation programmes such as ESPRIT or EUREKA - which soon included US 
firms themselves (Wyatt-Walker 1995). By the time the Delors Commission 
relaunched the idea of Euro-champions to help the ailing European electronics 
sector, the TNCs, as well as other import-competing firms, had abandoned their 
neo-mercantilist strategy (Ross 1993).
It is in this light that we have to understand the subsequent gradual shift 
towards a more neo-liberal orientation on the part of a majority of the 
Roundtable’s members. The globalization process (global sourcing and global 
alliances) accelerated in the 1980s and European economic integration became 
part and parcel of that process. The 1992 programme made the European 
economy more open to international trade and investment flows and therefore 
precluded mercantilism (Grahl and Teague 1990). Defensive régionalisation, as 
pursued by the ERT’s original membership, was no longer viable. Thus, the 
ERT shifted gears in 1991 and produced a blueprint for the future of Europe 
which Holman (1992) calls a ‘catch-all strategy’. This could be viewed as a 
first step towards an eventual synthesis (first fully expressed by the ERT in its 
1993 reports) between neo-mercantilism and neo-liberalism. An open world 
economy was now seen by a majority of ERT members as essential for the 
flourisning of European industry. However, in this view, a mere opening up of 
national economies should not be the only goal of European integration; there 
should also be a supranational framework to provide coherence and stability 
and help co-ordinate national efforts to promote economic expansion through 
investment in infrastructure and R&D. It is in this sense that the ERT’s neo­
liberalism is embedded: it is embedded in both the national and supranational 
institutions of the EU.
The strategic orientation of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’ served as a rallying 
point for both political and social forces at the transnational level and helped 
prepare the ideological ground for the Maastricht Treaty. For this reason, the 
Maastricht compromise represented neither a triumph for Thatcherite neo­
liberalism nor the construction of a neo-mercantilist Europe. Rather it 
expressed the synthetic concept of ‘embedded neo-liberalism’. Monetary union 
- the central part of the treaty - and its convergence criteria most clearly reflect 
the neo-liberal orthodoxy. But aspects of the Rhenish ‘network’ model can be 
found in the Maastricht chapters on ‘Trans-European [infrastructure] Networks’ 
and ‘Research and Technological Development’ (reflecting a German-style 
industrial policy or Ordnungspolitik) and in the appended Social Protocol and 
Agreement which sets out procedures for bargaining between European trade 




























































































Protocol had in fact figured prominently on the policy-agenda promoted by the 
European Roundtable.
Competing Capitalisms and the Regulatory Framework of Embedded Neo- 
Liberalism
But how precisely is this new regulatory framework interacting with the 
competition between capitalist models discussed in part on of this paper? To 
the extent that much of the European regulatory project allows ‘mutual 
recognition’ - i.e. competition between rules - European-level initiatives as 
such should have little effect, in theory, on the particular characteristics of 
‘network’ or ‘market-oriented’ systems. Thus a European ‘embedded neo- 
liberal’ Ordnungspolitik should accommodate national diversity rather than 
erode it. But what is the evidence to date?
Firstly, as Tsoukalis and Rhodes (1997) argue, until recently the main loss of 
sovereignty in Europe has involved a surrender of power not to European 
institutions and rules but to the market. This has been especially true in finance 
where globalization has ironed-out many of the regulatory distinctions that 
once characterized European countries. The international and domestic 
financial environment has been transformed by the emergence of global 
markets in short-term securities and cross-border equity trade, by rapid 
innovation in new financial instruments like derivatives (swaps, futures and 
options), and by the appearance of actors with transnational investments, 
including insurance companies, mutual investment funds and pension funds. 
Confronted with this challenge, national authorities have had to surrender 
traditional control over banking and financial markets, and monetary 
instruments like credit control, and replace them with regulatory frameworks 
that permit international capital flows. Once cosy relations between central 
banks and domestic financial communities have been undermined (Grahl and 
Teague 1990: 111-118; Dyson et al. 1995).
Meanwhile, although European initiatives derive from a free-market rather than 
‘neo-mercantilist’ vision, in most cases a ‘two-tier’ regulatory structure is being 
established in which a degree of slack is permitted for national distinctiveness. 
As a result, Europe is set to remain a regulatory mosaic for some, legardless of 
the greater uniformity that is also being created by pan-European rules. 
Alongside the other institutional and political impediments outlined above, this 
will prevent the adoption or imposition of a single European capitalist model. 
Finance again provides a clear example. The first step towards the creation of a 
free European financial area began in 1988 with the Capital Movements 




























































































level, a two-tier structure has been created. While the Commission is 
responsible for removing national barriers and controls, the main policy 
instruments - and responsibility for domestic market regulation - remain with 
the member states. The governing principle here is mutual recognition rather 
than harmonization. Under the Second Banking Directive of 1989, for example, 
banks of one country can offer a full range of services in another. But while a 
financial institution must comply with the market rules of the country in which 
it operates, responsibility for regulating that institution lies with its home 
country. Moreover, a full surrender of national influence is unlikely in the near 
future. Some countries enjoy derogations, preventing access to various parts of 
their financial sectors, while tax differences affecting many financial products 
remain extensive and most directives allow governments to apply local 
conduct-of-business rules to foreign firms.
In financial services - an area of regulation with far-reaching consequences for 
European corporate governance - EU directives have already altered business 
conduct, by introducing new standards of capital adequacy and risk assessment 
and increasing transparency. Old practices - insider trading, the monopoly 
status of traditional brokers, unregulated ‘gentleman’s’ agreements on conduct 
- have been swept away, and parochial stock exchange activities have been 
revolutionized by organizational change, computerization and - in the German 
case - a centralization of securities, futures and options trading and a 
privatization of the Frankfurt exchange. The 1996 Investment Services 
Directive (ISD) and its sibling, the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD), set new 
minimum standards for markets and traders and will help remove the last 
vestiges of ‘nationalism’ from Europe’s stock markets. But as with the Capital 
Movements and Second Banking Directives, scope for some national diversity 
is maintained. While it is no longer possible for governments and stock 
exchanges to prevent competition across their borders - for investment firms 
regulated in their own countries can acquire a ‘passport’ to operate in others 
and trade on foreign exchanges using remote access - host countries cannot take 
away the passport of ‘visiting’ companies (which may have been awarded it in 
a country with more relaxed standards) and capital adequacy standards will 
remain diverse, given that a minimum rather than a uniform level is required. At 
the same time, governments may continue to protect their markets, as evidenced 
by the problems of insurance companies gaining access to Germany and 
mortgage issuers in penetrating France (Financial Times, 16 February 1996).
As far as business regulation is concerned, there are considerable gaps in the 
European framework and in some respects the struggle between ‘global’ neo­
liberalism and ‘embedded’ neo-liberalism goes on. Thus, while the battle over 




























































































against the German region of Saxony for subsidizing a new Volkswagen plant), 
VAT rules are still unharmonized (in part because of the difficulties in bringing 
* corporate tax rates together - an essential step in preventing lower tax countries 
from enjoying unfair advantage) and bankruptcy laws remain nationally 
specific. The clearest case of struggle between the ‘global’ and the ‘embedded’ 
European perspectives has been over the proposed pan-European company 
structure - the Societas Europaea (SE) - which could replace national systems 
of incorporation for many companies. The key obstacles to a single European 
company statute are, once again, competing tax regimes and the national 
specificities of existing company law. But the role of employees within the firm 
is the most controversial issue. The present draft proposal includes provisions 
on workers’ information and consultation which the British want removed and 
the Germans want strengthened to include participation in management - as in 
their supervisory board system which allows for employee representation. But 
true to their global orientation, certain large British firms are opposed to a 
European statute altogether, advocating a mix of national and international 
governance, and a harmonization of rules for company behaviour through the 
International Accountancy Standards Committee. The latter may ultimately 
prevail. For attempts to reduce the diversity of accounting standards within the 
EU via the Fourth Directive on Company Accounts (1979) and the Seventh 
Directive on Consolidated Accounting (1983) produced little in the way of 
harmonization and the adoption of mutual recognition seems to have reduced 
the priority given to harmonization - regardless of the creation of an EU 
harmonization taskforce in 1990 - and as recent developments in Germany 
suggest, as national standards decline within the EU they are more likely to be 
replaced by international IAS or US GAAP rules than European standards 
(Vipond 1994; Leftwich 1997).
Conclusion
Whether embedded neo-liberalism will prove to be a stable European model of 
capitalism remains to be seen. What seems clear, however, is that the European 
Union will not recapture the public governance that is being eroded at the 
national level, since European integration will continue to be primarily a 
process of market integration (cf. Streeck and Crouch 1997). This supremacy of 
the market is ‘softened’, however, in so far as the single market is stm 
embedded by old institutions at the national level as well as - albeit minimally - 
by new European institutions. This form of embeddedness seems to be more 
geared to the interests of transnational industrial capital - with EU policies 
oriented to promoting the global competitiveness - than to the creation of a 




























































































neo-liberal Europe is located primarily at the national level. However, to the 
extent that the emphasis at the European level will be increasingly on mere 
market integration rather than European state-building, national embeddedness 
may also be hollowed out.
In this respect, much seems to depend on whether the power of global financial 
capital, which is the least interested in any form of embeddedness, will be 
reined in by the interests of industrial capital, whose longer-term success 
requires supportive social and political institutions. Nowhere is this conflict 
seen more clearly than in Germany where the largest banks have become the 
most important protagonists of change in the norms and values of the 
established German model. If the Anglo-Saxon model of finance gains more 
ground on the European continent, which seems more than likely - especially 
once European monetary union sweeps away the remaining national barriers to 
economic integration - then the social and political structures of European 
capitalisms may also be eroded and move towards the more minimal provisions 
of market-oriented systems. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to expect that 
while systems of corporate governance may converge, the external support 
networks of the Germanic - and, to a lesser extent, the Latin firms - will be 
remodelled rather than abandoned, given the manifest problems afflicting 
Britain’s ‘disembedded’ model. This is because these systems still gain 
competitive advantage from their ‘network’ resources, especially in terms of 
long-term, patient capital provision, the supply of transferable skills through 
training systems and the productive, consensus-based environment typified by 
the Germanic firm. That said, the stability of these systems will ultimately 
depend on the outcome of the political struggles described in part one of this 
paper - between stakeholders and shareholders, companies and their employees 
and private and publicly-oriented capital - and on their ability to accommodate 
the forces of global capitalism without also abandoning their own institutions 
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